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A SECURED PARTY'S RIGHT TO A DEFICIENCY
JUDGMENT AFTER NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THE
RESALE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 9

KATHRYN PAGE*

I. INTRODUCTION
A creditor's ability to obtain a deficiency judgment if he does
not comply with the resale provisions of section 9-504 of the
Uniform Commercial Code (Code) has long been an issue of
debate.' Several jurisdictions, in response to this problem, have
created a presumption that the repossessed collateral is worth the
amount of the outstanding debt. 2 To recover a deficiency, the
*B.A., Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, Ohio, 1980;.J.D., University of North
Dakota, 1983; member of the North Dakota Bar; currently practicing in Grand Forks. North
Dakota.
1. U.C.C. § 9-504 (1978). Section 9-504 outlines the creditor's procedures for disposition of the
debtor's collateral after the debtor's default. Seeid.
2. Jurisdictions creating the presumption that the repossessed collateral equals the outstanding
debt when the creditor does not comply with the resale provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code
are Alaska (seeWeaver v. O'Meara Motor Co., 452 P.2d 87 (Alaska 1969)); Arkansas (seeNorton v.
National Bank of Commerce, 240 Ark. 143, 398 S.W.2d 538 (1966)); Colorado (see Community
Mgmt. Ass'n v. Tousley, 32 Colo. App. 33, 505 P.2d 1314 (1973)); Connecticut (see Savings
Bank of New Britain v. Booze, 34 Conn. Supp. 532, 382 A.2d 226 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1977)):
Indiana (see Hall v. Owen County State Bank, 175 Ind. App. 150, 370 N.E.2d 918 (1977)):
Mississippi (seeWalker v. V.M. Motor Co., 325 So.2d 905 (Miss. 1976)); Nebraska (seeCornett v.
White Motor Corp., 190 Neb. 496, 209 N.W.2d 341 (1973))- Nevada (seeLevers v. Rio King Land
& Inv. Co., 93 Nev. 95, 560 P.2d 917 (1977)); New Jersey (seeConti Causeway Ford v. Jarossy,
114 N.J. Super. 382, 276 A.2d 402 (Ocean County Ct. 1971)); New Mexico (see Clark Leasing
Corp. v. White Sands Forest Prods., Inc., 87 N.M. 451, 535 P.2d 1077 (1975)); North Dakota (see
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secured party must rebut this presumption by showing that the
price received for the collateral was equal to the collateral's fair
market value.3 The purposes of this Article are to examine the
development of this presumption and to discuss the evidence
necessary to rebut it.
II. PROCEEDINGS AFTER DEFAULT
A.

REPOSSESSION,

DISPOSITION,

AND

DISTRIBUTION

OF

PROCEEDS

Before this Article analyzes the various approaches to remedy
creditor noncompliance, a brief discussion of the parties' rights and
liabilities after default may be helpful. The post-default
proceedings that will be discussed in this Article include
repossession, disposition, and distribution of the proceeds.
Unless the parties have agreed otherwise, the secured party
may take possession of the collateral securing the debt after
default. 4 After the creditor has repossessed the collateral, one of
three events must occur. First, the debtor may redeem the property
by paying the debt and any consequential expenses incurred by the
secured party. 5 Second, if the debtor does not redeem, the secured
6
party may keep the collateral in full satisfaction of the debt.
Finally, the secured party may "sell, lease or otherwise dispose of
. . the collateral" 7 at a public or private proceeding. 8
State Bank of Burleigh County Trust Co. v. All-American Sub, Inc., 289 N.W.2d 772 (N.D. 1980));
North Carolina (see Hodges v. Norton, 29 N.C. App. 193, 223 S.E.2d 848 (1976)); Rhode Island (see
, 408 A.2d 930 (1979)); and Texas (see
RI.
Associates Capital Serv. Corp. v. Riccardi,.
Ward v. First State Bank, 605 S.W.2d 404 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980)).
3. See, e.g., Norton v. National Bank of Commerce, 240 Ark. 143,
-_, 398 S.W.2d 538, 542
(1966) (when repossession sale not conducted according to law the creditor has the burden of proving
the amount that should have been obtained through repossession sale conducted according to law);
Community Mgmt. Ass'n v. Tousley, 32 Colo. App. 33, 38, 505 P.2d 1314, 1317
(1973) (when repossession sale not conducted in accordance with UCC requirements, secured
party must prove that amount received is equal to market value).
4. U.C.C. § 9-503 (1978). Section 9-503 provides that the secured party may take possession
through judicial action or without judicial action if it can be accomplished without a breach of the
peace. Id. Furthermore, if the parties have agreed in the security agreement, the creditor may
require the debtor to assemble the collateral and make it available to the secured party at a
reasonably convenient designated location. Id.
5. Id. 5 9-506. If the debtor wishes to redeem, he must do so before the secured party has
disposed of the collateral, entered into a contract for its disposal, or discharged the obligation under
§ 9-505 (2). Id. The debtor may agree not to redeem, but this agreement must be in writing and can
occur only after default. Id.
6. Id. 5 9-505 (2). If the secured party proposes to retain the collateral in satisfaction of the
obligation, the secured party must send written notice of this intent to the debtor. Id. The secured
party must also send notice to other secured parties who have sent the creditor written notice of their
claim of an interest in the collateral before the creditor announces his intent to retain the collateral.
Id. If the secured party receives an objection in writing from a person entitled to receive notification
within 21 days after notice was sent, the secured party must dispose of the collateral. Id. If the debtor
has paid at least 60% of the cash price of a consumer good, the secured party must dispose of the
collateral. Id. § 9-505 (1).
7. Id. 5 9-504(1).
8. Id. § 9-504 (3).
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If the debtor does not redeem the collateral, the secured party
may elect to sell or otherwise dispose of the collateral. Should the
creditor elect to dispose of the collateral, he must comply with two
obligations. First, except in specified circumstances, 9 the creditor
must give the debtor reasonable notice of the disposition. 10 Second,
the disposition must be commercially reasonable. "
The proceeds of the disposition are first applied to the expenses
of repossession, preparation for disposition, and disposition of the
3
collateral.1 2 The debt secured by the collateral is then satisfied.'
Next, if a subordinate security interest exists and the subordinate
secured party makes a written demand for satisfaction, the
proceeds necessary to satisfy this claim must be paid to the
subordinate secured party.' 4 Any money remaining after these
distributions is paid to the debtor.15 When the proceeds from the
disposition of the collateral do not satisfy the secured indebtedness,
6
the debtor must make up the difference, or "deficiency."'
Section 9-507 of the Code details the debtor's remedies if the
secured creditor does not comply with Part 5 of Article 9. Prior to
the sale or other disposition of the property, the debtor may obtain
a court order to prevent the sale or disposition if it appears that the
secured party is not complying with Part 5.17 If an unlawful
disposition has occurred, the debtor may recover from the secured
party "any loss caused by failure to comply with the provisions of
this Part. "18 Neither section 9-507 nor the Code comments indicate
whether the debtor may be relieved of his obligation to pay the
deficiency when the secured party does not conform with Part 5 of
Article 9.19
9. Id. The secured party need not send notice of the sale to the debtor if the "collateral is
perishable or threatens to decline speedily in value or is of a type customarily sold on a recognized
market ...." Id.
10. Id. Section 9-504 (3) provides that "reasonable notification of the time and place of public
sale or reasonable notification of the time after which any private sale or other intended disposition is
to be made shall be sent by the secured party to the debtor .... - Id.
11. Id. Section 9-504 (3) provides that "[slale or other disposition may be as a unit or in parcels
and at any time and place and on any terms but every aspect of the disposition including the method,
manner, time, place and terms must be commercially reasonable." Id.
The Code does not define the term "commercially reasonable," but case law indicates that this
standard requires good faith on the part of the secured party and reasonable diligence to protect the
interests of the debtor. See e.g., Hall v. Owen County State Bank, 175 Ind. App. 150, 370 N.E.2d
918 (1977).
12. U.C.C. S 9-504 (1) (a) (1978).
13. Id.§9-504(1)(b).
14. Id. § 9-504 (1) (c). The secured party may require the holder of the subordinate security
interest to provide proof of the interest before complying with the demand. Id.
15. Id. S 9-504 (2).
16. Id. The secured creditor and debtor may agree that the debtor will not be liable for any
deficiency. Id. If the underlying transaction is a sale of accounts or chattel paper, the debtor's
liability for a deficiency or entitlement to a surplus must be created by the security agreement. Id.
1 7. Id. § 9-507 (1).
18. Id.
19. One commentator has suggested that the issue of whether a debtor's liability may be
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THREE RESULTS OF PROCEDURAL NONCOMPLIANCE

Courts that have construed this uniform law have not reached
uniform conclusions. The courts have advanced three methods to
solve the problem of a secured party's noncompliance with the
resale provisions of section 9-504. The three methods are the
"absolute bar" approach, the "set-off" approach, and the "shift"
approach.
1. The Absolute Bar Approach
Under the absolute bar approach, a secured creditor's failure
to comply with section 9-504 results in a complete bar to a
deficiency judgment. 20 This position has been supported under
various theories. First, courts deciding cases under the Uniform
Conditional Sales Act (UCSA) generally have denied a deficiency
when the secured party did not comply with the resale provisions of
the Act. 2 1 Since the Code did not specifically reject this remedy,
22
some courts have applied it to the Code.
A second theory is based on the assumption that the notice
provision of section 9-504 is intended to protect the debtor's right to
redeem the property or bid at its sale. 23 The courts adopting this

theory reason that when the debtor loses the right to redeem
because of the creditor's misbehavior, the secured creditor should
lose his right to a deficiency judgment. 24 Third, some
commentators have noted that a denial of a deficiency judgment
after noncompliance serves as a deterrent to creditor
misbehavior. 25 Finally, other courts have considered principles of
"extinguished when a secured party does not comply with Article 9, Part 5 of the Code was not
considered by the drafters of the Code."

2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY

44.9.4 at 1264 (1965).
20. See Skeels v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 222 F. Supp. 696 (W.D.Pa. 1963), rev'd in part,
335 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1964) (secured party who fails to give notice cannot recover any deficiency);
Atlas Thrift Co. v. Horan, 27 Cal. App. 3d 999, 104 Cal. Rptr. 315 (Ct. App. 1972) (strict
compliance with the resale provisions of § 9-504 is a condition precedent to recovery of deficiency);
Leasco Data Processing Equip. v. Atlas Shirt Co., 66 Misc.2d 1089, 323 N.Y.S.2d 13 (Civ. Ct.
1971) (the right to a deficiency judgment depends on compliance with the notice and disposition
requirements of § 9-504).
21. SeeAnnot., 49 A.L.R.2d 82 (1956).
22. See Leasco Data Processing Equip. v. Atlas Shirt Co., 66 Misc.2d 1089, 1091, 323 N.Y.S.2d
13, 15 (Civ. Ct. 1971). The Leaso court stated, "If the authors of the UCC proposed to overthrow
the firmly established and generally accepted construction of the older statute denying recovery for a
deficiency where there was not precise compliance with the notice requirement, they surely would
have manifested that intent in clear and unambiguous language." Id.
23. Skeels v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 222 F. Supp. 696 at 702. The court in Skeels stated
that "to permit recovery by the security holder of a loss in disposing of collateral when no notice has
been given permits a continuation of the evil which the Commercial Code sought to correct. The
owner should have an opportunity to bid at the sale." Id.
24. Id.
25. See Posel, Sales and Sales Financing, 16 RUTGERS L. REV. 329, 345 (denial of a deficiency
Judgment should be classified as a penalty against a secured party rather than as a damage award to
the debtor).
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equity and fair play to support a denial of a deficiency. 26 As one
court has stated, "The rule and requirement are simple. If the
secured creditor wishes a deficiency judgment he must obey the
law. If he does not obey the law, he may not have his deficiency
judgment. "27
2. The Set-Off Approach
Other courts have adopted the "set-off" approach, which
allows the secured creditor to obtain a deficiency judgment, but the
creditor will be liable to the debtor for any harm resulting from his
noncompliance with section 9-504.28 The courts applying this
approach have emphasized that the Code does not specifically deny
a deficiency to a misbehaving secured party.2 9 Rather, section 9507(1) gives the debtor an affirmative action against the secured
party. 30 Under this approach, any damages that the debtor can
prove are subtracted or "set off" from the deficiency judgment,
thereby lessening the total amount recovered by the secured
party. 31
3. The Shift Approach
Dissatisfaction with the results obtained under the "absolute
bar" and the "set-off"' approaches led to the creation of a third
solution to the problem.3 2 Under the "shift" approach, when a
debtor shows that the secured party did not comply with section 9504 in disposing of the collateral, a presumption arises that the
collateral was worth at least the amount of the debt.33 To obtain a
26. See, e.g., Atlas Thrift Co. v. Horan, 27 Cal. App. 3d 999, 104 Cal. Rptr. 315 (Ct. App.
1972).
27. Id. at 1009, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 321.
28. See Mercantile Fin. Corp. v. Miller, 298 F. Supp. 797, 801 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (debtor must
prove that collateral was worth more than the price received at disposition); Grant County Tractor
Co. v. Nuss, 6 Wash. App. 866, 869-70, 496 F.2d 966, 969 (1972) (debtor must show loss resulting
frotin in proper disposition).
29. Grant County Tractor Co. v. Nuss, b Wash. App. at bb9-/TU, 496 P.2d at 969. The court in
Nuss noted that because of the remedies detailed in U.C.C. § 9-507, the Code drafters could not have
intended that failure to give notice would result in a forfeiture of the creditor's right to recover a
deficiency. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See Associates Capital Serv. Corp. v. Riccardi, __
R.I.
408 A.2d 930, 933
(1979). The Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that after a commercially unreasonable sale of'
collateral a presumption is created that the fair market value of the collateral at the time of sale was
equal to the debt owed the secured party. Id. at 934. The court arrived at this result after it rejected
the rationales used by other courts in deciding the issue. Id. at 933.
33. Id. at 934. See also Norton v. National Bank of Commerce, 240 Ark. 143, 398 S.W.2d 538
(1966) (when creditor does not comply with S 9-504, presumption arises that collateral sold was
worth at least the amount of the debt); Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Rone, 248 Ark. 665, 453
S.W.2d 37 (1970) (failure to give notice cannot constitute an absolute defense to action for deficiency
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deficiency judgment, the secured party must rebut this
presumption. 3 4 To rebut this presumption the secured party must
prove that the property was sold at its fair market value at the
5
disposition.3
The North Dakota Supreme Court adopted the shift approach
36
in State Bank of Burleigh County Trust Co. v. All-American Sub, Inc.

The court in All-American Sub reasoned that to allow a debtor to
avoid liability because the credit6r failed to comply with section 950437 "would not be in keeping with the spirit of commercial
reasonableness."

'3 8

The remainder of this Article will discuss the

rationales supporting the shift approach and the evidence necessary
to rebut the arising presumption.
III. THE DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATION OF THE
SHIFT APPROACH
A.

THE No-NOTICE PROBLEM

The leading case applying the shift approach is Norton v.
National Bank of Commerce.3 9 Norton, an automobile dealer, sold a
car to a customer, who executed a promissory note and a
conditional sales contract for the unpaid purchase price. 40 On the
same day Norton assigned, with recourse, the note and the contract
to the National Bank of Commerce. 4 1 The buyer defaulted after
making the first two monthly payments. 42 The National Bank of
Commerce repossessed and resold the car without giving notice of
the sale to either Norton or the buyer. 43 The bank demanded the
judgment); Carter v. Ryburn Ford Sale, 248 Ark. 236, 451 S.W.2d 199 (1970) (secured party's
failure to comply with the resale provisions of § 9-504 did not entitle debtor to a directed verdict in a
suit for damages from the sale ofcollateral); T & W Ice Cream, Inc. v. Carriage Barn, Inc., 107 N.J.
Super. 328, 258 A.2d 162 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1969) (when the secured party fails to give notice of
disposition, the burden of proving the value of the collateral is on the secured party).
34. Associates Capital Serv. Corp. v. Riccardi,
- R.I. at __, 408 A.2d at 934.
35. Id. at 933-34.
36. 289 N.W.2d 772 (N.D. 1980).
37. Section 9-504 of the U.C.C. is codified at S 41-09-50 of the North Dakota Century Code. See
N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-09-50 (1983).
38. State Bank of Burleigh County Trust Co. v. All-American Sub, Inc., 289 N.W.2d 772, 780
(N.D. 1980). The court in All-American Sub quoted from Conti Causeway Ford v. Jarossy, 114 N.J.
Super. 382, 386, 276 A.2d 402, 404-05 (Ocean County Ct. 1971) in adopting the shift approach. 289
N.W.2d at 780. Because the resale was commercially reasonable, the court did not find it necessary
to decide whether or not the creditor gave sufficient notice. Id. at 778.
39. 240 Ark. 143, 398 S.W.2d 538 (1966).
40. Norton v. National Bank ofCommerce, 240 Ark. 143,
398 S.W.2d 538, 539 (1966).
41. Id. at __, 398 S.W.2d at 539. Norton endorsed the note and assigned the contract to the
National Bank of Commerce. Id. The assignment contained a provision that if the purchaser should
default, Norton would repurchase the contract for the amount of the unpaid balance plus any
additional costs and expenses. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. The National Bank of Commerce notified the buyer by letter that it had repossessed the
car. Id. Fifteen days later the National Bank of Commerce sold the car by private sale to one of its
customers without giving notice of the sale to either the buyer or Norton. Id.
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deficiency from Norton and, when he refused to pay, sued Norton
44
alone for the deficiency.
The Arkansas Supreme Court held that Norton was a debtor
and was entitled to notice of the impending sale. 4 5 The court,
however, rejected the absolute bar theory on two grounds. 46 The
court first found that section 9-504(2) of the Code renders the
47
debtor liable for any deficiency remaining after disposition.
Additionally, section 9-507 allows the debtor to recover any loss
caused by the secured party's failure to comply with the resale
provisions of the Code. 48 The court held that these provisions,
taken together, prevent the conclusion that a noncomplying
secured party is absolutely barred from obtaining a deficiency
judgment.

Confronting the issue of Norton's damages, the court
concluded that "simple considerations of fair play cast the burden
of proof upon the bank." 50 The bank wrongfully disposed of the
collateral by selling it without notifying Norton. 5 1 By this action,
the bank made it "difficult, if not impossible" for Norton to prove
that he suffered any loss by the disposition. 52 The court reasoned
that it would be unfair to allow the secured party to benefit from its
own misconduct and determined that the equitable solution to this
problem was to create the presumption that the collateral was worth
at least the amount of the debt, thereby shifting the burden to the
secured party to prove that the amount obtained at the sale was the
amount that could reasonably have been obtained at a lawful
3
disposition
Other courts followed the Norton lead and expanded on the
rationale behind the shift approach. The underlying idea that runs
throughout these cases is that it is fundamentally unfair to excuse a
debtor of his obligation to pay an often sizeable deficiency simply
44. Id. The National Bank of Commerce received $75.00 on the sale of the car, leaving an
unpaid balance of $277.88 on the debt. Id.
45. Id. at __,
398 S.W.2d at 540. The court determined that Norton was a debtor within the
terms of Arkansas Statutes Annotated S 85-9-504 (3). Id. See ARK. STAT. ANN. S 85-9-504 (3) (1947 &
Supp. 1983). Title 85 of the Arkansas Statutes Annotated "shall be known and may be cited as the
Uniform Commercial Code." Id. § 85-1-101.
46.Norton, 240 Ark. at -, 398 S.W.2d at 541-42. Norton contended that the bank's failure to
give him notice of the sale discharged him from liability for any deficiency. Id.
47. Id. at __,398 S.W.2d at 542.
48. Id.
49. Id. at __, 398 S.W.2d at 541-42.
50. Id. at __,

398 S.W.2d at 542.

51. Id, Because the court determined Norton was a debtor under S 85-9-504(3) of the Arkansas
Statutes Annotated, Norton was entitled to notice of the sale. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. The court in Norton remanded the case for a new trial to determine the amount National
Bank of Commerce would have obtained through a lawful sale. Id.
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because the secured party failed to give notice.5 4 At the same time,
however, courts have tried to protect the debtor from the possibility
55
of sham sales, which the notice provision was intended to prevent.
Many courts have first looked to the specific language of the
Code to resolve the no-notice problem. Sections 9-502(2) and 9504(2) give the secured creditor the right to collect any deficiency
remaining after disposition of secured collateral. 56 Both sections
state that "unless otherwise agreed, the debtor is liable for any
deficiency." ' 57 The Colorado Court of Appeals in Community
Management Association of Colorado Springs v. Tousley5 8 adopted the
shift approach solely because section 9-504(2) gives the secured
creditor the right to a deficiency. 59 Similarly, in Associates Capital
Services Corp. v. Riccardi,60 the Rhode Island Supreme Court held
that since section 9-504(2) unequivocally renders the debtor liable
61
for the deficiency, the absolute bar approach was unsupportable.
In Hall v. Owen County State Bank6 2 the Indiana Court of Appeals
54. See, e.g., Rushton v. Shea, 423 F. Supp. 468 (D. Del. 1976). The court noted that barring a
deficiency judgment would unduly punish the secured party while granting the debtor a windfall. Id.
at 471. Shifting the burden to the creditor to prove the value of the collateral sufficiently protects the
commercial debtor. Id. The court in Rushton stated, "No sound policy requires us to inject a drastic
punitive element into a commercial context." Id. (quoting Cornett v. White Motor Corp., 190 Neb.
496, 501, 209 N.W.2d 341, 344 (1973)).
55. See, e.g., Ward v. First State Bank, 605 S.W.2d 404, 406 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980). In
discussing a debtor's remedies when a creditor fails to comply with the notice provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code, the court in Ward stated:
[Cjourts, obviously influenced by their own notions of fair play, have attempted to
formulate a workable rule to protect the debtor from sham sales and at the same time
to protect the secured creditor's right to a deficiency judgment. In order to effectuate
this rule it is better to adopt a "rebuttable presumption" view and allow the courts to
review each different fact situation rather than adopting a strict view that a failure, for
any reason, to give [S 9-504(c)] notice shall be a complete bar to a deficiency
judgment. The strict view of"no notice, no deficiency" is undesirable because it is the
debtor who initiates the misconduct, if any, by failing to pay his debt. Therefore, there
is no reason to unduly penalize the secured creditor.
Id. at 406 (quoting Comment, Texas Business & Commerce Code - Failureto Give Notice of ForeclosureSale,
as Required by Section 9.504, Is Not a Barto Creditor'sRight to an Article 9 DeficiencyJudgment, 8 TEX. TECH
L. REV. 560, 567 (1976)).
56. U.C.C. §§ 9-504(2), 9-502(2) (1978). Section 9-504(2) states that "[i]f the security interest
secures an indebtedness, the secured party must account to the debtor for any surplus, and, unless
otherwise agreed, the debtor is liable for any deficiency." Id. § 9-504(2). Section 9-502(2) also
provides that "[i]f the security agreement secures an indebtedness . . . unless otherwise agreed, the
debtor is liable for any deficiency." Id. § 9-502(2).
57. Id. S 9-504(2), 9-502(2).
58.32 Colo. App. 33, 505 P.2d 1314(1973).
59. Community Mgmt. Ass'n v. Tousley, 32 Colo. App. 33, __,
505 P.2d 1314, 1316
(1973). The court in Tousley noted that the "right of a secured party to a deficiency judgment is
established by IU.C.C. § 9-504(2)]." Id. The court reasoned that failure to give reasonable notice of
the sale should not result in a forfeiture of the right to a deficiency judgment, but should shift the
burden to the secured party to prove the market value of the collateral by use of evidence other than
the amount received. Id. at __, 505 P.2d 1314, 1316-17.
60.
- RI....
,408 A.2d 930 (1979).
61. Associates Capital Serv. Corp. v. Riccardi, __
R.I.
408 A.2d 930, 933
(1979). The court noted that denying a deficiency runs counter to the iervasive spirit of fairness that
is at the heart of the Code. Id. The court, therefore, adopted the "shift" approach. Id. at
, 408
A.2d at 934.
62. 175 Ind. App. 150, 370 N.E. 2d 918(Ct. App. 1977).
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noted that the right to collect a deficiency is not taken away in any
section of Article 9.63 The court reasoned that since there is no
specific language directing that a secured creditor who fails to give
notice will be barred from recovering a deficiency courts should not
64
have the authority to invoke such a sanction.
In addition to the explicit directive that the debtor is liable for
the deficiency, the Code contains a plain statement of the debtor's
remedies for a creditor's improper resale. 65 Section 9-507 of the
Code provides that if a secured party is not proceeding with the
disposition in compliance with the Code, the debtor may obtain an
order to restrain the secured party. 66 Section 9-507 further provides
that damages are available to the debtor for any loss resulting from
an improper disposition. 67 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit in United States v. Whitehouse Plastics,66 noting the specificity
and detail of the debtor's remedies in 9-507, concluded that the
drafters of the Code could not have intended that a debtor who did
not receive notice would also be entitled to the additional remedy of
69
having the deficiency extinguished.
The Code policy of commercial reasonableness has also
provided guidance for courts confronted with the no-notice
problem. The NewJersey Supreme Court, in Conti Causeway Fordv.
Jarossy,70 justified its application of the shift approach by stating
that the purpose of the Code was to establish rules for commercial
transactions that were commercially reasonable. 71 This policy of
commercial reasonableness, the court held, directed that a secured
370 N.E.2d 918, 926 (Ct. App.
63. Hall v. Owen County State Bank, 175 Ind. App. 150, __,
1977).
64. Id. The court in Hall noted that from the language of S 9-504 the drafters of the Code either
did not consider the question of a creditor's failure to give notice or decided to leave the question
open. Id. at __, 370 N.E.2d at 926.
The court, however, compared § 9-504 with § 2-706 of the Code, which allows the seller of goods
to resell those goods after breach by the buyer. Id. The court stated that the resale of goods after a
buyer's breach is similar to a repossession sale and suit for the deficiency. Id. The court noted that
§ 2-706 strongly implies that notice to the buyer in this situation is a condition precedent to the
ret( ocrv ofdamages. Id.See U.C.C. 5 2-706 (1978).
7
notes 66-6 for the relevant text of § 9-507(l).
65. See U.C.C. § 9-507(l) (1978). See infra
66. U.C.C. § 9-507(1) (1978). Section 9-507(1) provides that if the debtor can establish "that
the secured party is not proceeding in accordance with the provisions of this Part disposition may be
ordered or restrained on appropriate terms and conditions." Id.
the disposition has occurred the debtor .. has a right to
67. Id. Section 9-507(l ) states that "[ilf
recover from the secured party any loss caused by a failure to comply with the provisions of this
Part." Id.
68. 501 F.2d692 (5th Cir. 1974).
69. United States v. Whitehouse Plastics, 501 F.2d 692, 696 (5th Cir. 1979). The court
concluded that an absolute bar theory would undoubtedly serve as an incentive to compliance with
the notice provisions of the Code, "but the alternative of creating a rebuttable presumption favoring
the debtor would also tend to serve this function and appears more in keeping with the scheme of the
Code." Id. at 695. The debtors were free to submit evidence that they were prejudiced by the lack of
notice and the burden would then be on the secured party to rebut this evidence. Id. at 696.
70. 114 N.J. Super. 382, 276 A.2d 402 (1971).
7 1. (;onti Causewav Ford v. Jarossy, 114 N.J. Super. 382, __, 276 A.2d 402, 404 (1971).
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creditor must not be arbitrarily deprived of his deficiency
judgment.7 2 The North Dakota Supreme Court also emphasized
the importance of commercial reasonableness in the Code when it
reaffirmed the application of the shift approach in State Bank of
Towner v. Hansen.7 3 In Hansen the debtor argued that the bank's
failure to notify him of the resale barred the bank from collecting a
deficiency. 7 4 The court rejected this argument stating, "We do not
believe that the Uniform Commercial Code, which was written in
the spirit of commercial reasonableness, would countenance such
an onerous result without statutory language expressly mandating
it. . . .
75 The court was concerned that, in many cases, imposing
an absolute bar would be a harsh and punitive remedy. 76
The Code policy against punitive damages has concerned
other courts deciding no-notice cases. 77 The Nebraska Supreme
Court, in Cornett v. White Motor Corp., 78 rejected the summary
denial of the deficiency stating that "[n]o sound policy requires us
to inject a drastic punitive element into a commercial context." 7 9
The Hall court noted that the policy of the Code expressed in
section 1-106 indicates that an aggrieved party is to be fully
recompensed, but that punitive damages are to be avoided. 80 The
court concluded that absolutely denying a deficiency would result
72. Id.
73. 302 N.W.2d 760 (N.D. 1981). The North Dakota Supreme Court first determined that the
shift approach should apply in State Bank of Burleigh County Trust Co. v. All-American Sub, Inc.,
289 N.W.2d 772, 779-80 (N.D. 1980).
74. State Bank ofTowner v. Hansen, 302 N.W.2d 760, 767 (N.D. 1981). The bank conceded
that they did not give the debtor notice prior to the sale of the collateral. Id. at 764.
75. Id. at 767.
76. Id. The court in Hansen noted that the deficiency was more than $200,000 and that a jury
might find this amount still owing after crediting the debtor with the fair market value of the
collateral sold. Id.
The court also looked to § 1-106 of the Code, which states:
The remedies provided by this Act shall be liberally administered to the end that the
aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other party had fully
performed but neither consequential or special nor penal damages may be had except
as specifically provided in this Act or by other rule of law.
U.C.C. § 1-106(1) (1977). The court concluded that an absolute bar to a deficiency would impose a
punitive sanction upon the creditor. 302 N.W.2d at 767.
77. See, e.g., Hall v. Owen County State Bank, 175 Ind. App. 150, 370 N.E.2d 918 (Ct. App.
1977) (policy of the Code is to provide full recompense to aggrieved party without assessing penal
damages); Clark Leasing Corp. v. White Sands Forest Prods., Inc., 87 N.M. 451, 535 P.2d 1077
(1975) (complete denial of a deficiency "smacks of the punitive" and is directly contrary to Article
9's underlying theme of commercial reasonableness).
78. 190 Neb. 496, 209 N.W.2d 341 (1973). In Cornett the creditor repossessed and disposed of
garbage trucks in a commercially unreasonable manner. Cornett v. White Motor Corp., 190 Neb.
496, 497, 209 N.W.2d 341, 342 (1973). The creditor, however, was able to show that he obtained the
fair market value for the trucks and was granted a deficiency. Id. at 501, 209 N.W.2d at 344.
79. Id. The creditor was granted a deficiency judgment sufficient to cover the debtor's unpaid
balance plus the expenses of repossession and repair of the collateral. Id. at 502, 209 N.W.2d at 345.
80. Hall v. Owen County State Bank, 175 Ind. App. 150,
-. , 370 N.E.2d 918, 927 (Ct. App.
1977). See U.C.C. § 1-106(l) (1978). See supra note 76 tor the text of'S 1-106.
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in a rejection of that policy. 81
Section 1-106 contains another policy statement, which courts
have applied in adopting the shift approach. This section states that
"[tihe remedies provided by the Act shall be liberally administered
to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position
as if the other party had fully performed.... ",82 The Hall court,
which cited favorably to this section, noted that an analysis of the
merits of each case was necessary to effectuate the underlying
policies of the Code. 83
The shift approach meets the requirements of section 1-106.
An inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the sale allows the
court to determine whether the debtor has been harmed. If the
debtor has been harmed, the court can place him in as good a
position as if the secured party had complied with the notice
requirement by reducing or extinguishing the deficiency judgment.
If the lack of notice did not harm the debtor, the only way a court
can place the secured party in as good a position as if the debtor had
fully performed is for the court to grant the creditor a deficiency
judgment. The absolute bar approach does not permit this inquiry.
Another important Code policy mandates that the rules
governing commercial transactions should be flexible. Section 1102(1) states that the Code "shall be liberally construed and
applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies. "84 Section
1-102(2)(a) states that the purposes and policies of the Code are "to
simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial
transactions" 8 5 and "to permit the continued expansion of
commercial practices .... ,,16 The drafters' desired goal, therefore,
was flexibility. 87 The drafters understood that commercial
legislation could not be etched in stone. The drafters intended that
81. 175 Ind. App. at-,
370 N.E.2d at 927.
82. U.C.C. S 1-206(1) (1978). See supra note 76 for the full text of § 1-106(1).
83. Hall, 175 Ind. App. at __, 370 N.E.2d at 927. The court in Hall noted that the drafters of
the Code intended to do away with rigid rules of law designed to govern allsituations in favor of a
case by case analysis. Id. This procedure would allow parties to reach the merits of each case instead
of becoming entangled in procedural technicalities. Id.
84. U.C.C. 5 1-102(1)(1978).
85. Id. § 1-102(2)(a).
86. Id.§ 1-102(2)(b).
87. Id.§ 1-102 comment 1.Comment I provides that:
This Act isdrawn to provide flexibility so that, since it is intended to be a semipermanent piece of legislation, it will provide its own machinery for expansion of
commercial practices. It is intended to make it possible for the law embodied in this
Act to be developed by the courts in the light of unforeseen and new circumstances and
practices.
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the Code would "make it possible for the law embodied in this Act
to be developed by the courts in the light of unforeseen and new
circumstances and practices." 8 8 A summary denial of a deficiency
judgment does not promote flexibility in the rules governing
commercial transactions.
The court in Hall noted the goal of flexibility. 89 The court
stated that "the drafters of the UCC intended to do away with the
rigid rules of law designed to govern in all situations in favor of
more fluid guidelines which allow a case by case analysis." 90 The
court indicated that the goal of the Code was to permit settlement of
cases on the merits, rather than by application of technical rules. 9 1
The Hall court held that a summary denial of a deficiency judgment
for want of notice contravened this intent of the Code drafters. 92
Having concluded that lack of notice did not bar recovery of
the deficiency, some courts reconciled this result with case law
decided under the Uniform Conditional Sales Act (UCSA). 9s
Under the UCSA, compliance with the notice requirements was a
condition precedent to the recovery of the deficiency. 94 In Conti
Causeway Ford v. Jarossy9 5 the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected

the notion that since noncompliance with the notice provisions of
the UCSA resulted in a denial of a deficiency judgment,
noncompliance with the Code should have similar results. 9 6 The
court found that the notice provision in the Code was more flexible
than that contained in the UCSA. 9 7 The Code only requires that
the notice and sale be commercially reasonable. 9 The court
reasoned, therefore, that when the creditor did not give notice, the
issue became whether the sale was so commercially unreasonable
that recovery should have been barred. 99
88. See id.
89. Hall, 175 Ind. App. at__,
370 N.E.2d at 927.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at __,
370 N.E.2d at 926-27.
93. See UNI. COND. SALES ACT § 19 U.L.A. 30-31 (1922).
94. 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 44.9.4, at 1263 (1965).
Professor Gilmore notes that even the most technical noncompliance barred a deficiency under the
UCSA. Id, See, e.g., Commercial Credit Corp. v. Swiderski, 195 A.2d 546 (Del. Super. Ct. 1963)
(lone defect in the resale was that required notice was published in a newspaper four days before the
sale rather than five days as required by UCSA).
95. 114 N.J. Super. 382, 276 A.2d 402 (1971).
96. Conti Causeway Ford v. Jarossy, 114 N.J. Super. 382,
-,
276 A.2d 402, 404 (Ocean
County Ct. 1971). The court injarossy noted that under the UCSA the seller was required to give at
least ten days written notice of the sale. Id. By contrast, the Code does not require a specific time
period; the Code requires that the notice and sale be "commercially reasonable." Id. (quoting
U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1968) (amended 1978)).
97. See 114 N.J. Super. at __,276 A.2d at 404.
98. See U.C.C. S 9-504(3) (1978).
99. Jarossy, 114 NJ. Super. at __,
276 A.2d at 404. The court in.larossy stated that when
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Furthermore, as one commentator has noted, the purpose of
the Code's notice requirement is different than that contained in
the UCSA. 0 0° The UCSA required a secured party to dispose of the
collateral only at a public sale and give at least ten days notice to
0 If the creditor did not give the
both the debtor and the public.°'
required notice, the UCSA's public sales requirement would be
defeated. 1 0 2 In contrast, the Code states that the secured party need
only give the debtor notice of the time after which the collateral will
be sold.' 0 3 In addition, the Code encourages private resales of
collateral. 10 4 These two factors, taken together, indicate that notice
05
is less important under the Code than it was under the UCSA.'
The Delaware Federal District Court, adopting the shift
approach in Rushton v. Shea, 106 detailed the purposes of the Code's
notice requirement.' 0 7 First, notice allows the debtor an
opportunity to redeem. 10 8 Second, if the proposed disposition
appears unfair, notice gives the debtor a chance to intervene in the
disposition before it occurs. 10 9 Third, notice allows the debtor to
procure other purchasers who may be interested in purchasing the
collateral. 110 The court stated that the last two purposes "serve the
ultimate goal of allowing the debtor to maximize the sale price of
reasonable notice of the sale has not been given, "the spirit of commercial reasonableness requires
that the secured party not be arbitrarily deprived of his deficiency but that the burden of proof be
shifted to him to prove that the sale resulted in the fair and reasonable value of the security being
276 A.2d at 404-05. When the creditor has met this
credited to the debtor's account." Id. at -,
, 276
Id. at __
burden, "the resultant deficiency ought to be collectable by the secured party.
A.2d at 405.
100. See Note, The Right to an Article 9 Deficiency Judgment Without 9-504 Notice of Resale, 7 VAL.
U. L. R -:v.
465 S (1973).
Under the UCSA two types of notice were required: notice to the buyer and notice to the public.
Id.at 473-74. The UCSA insisted that the secured party dispose of the collateral at public sale or
auction. Id.at 474. The purpose of the UCSA notice requirement, therefore, was to provide for
public sales and auctions. Id.
101. Id. at 473-74.
102. Id. at 474. Whereas public sales were required under the U.C.S.A., see supra notes 100-01
and accompanying text, private sales of the collateral are encouraged under the Code. See U.C.C.
51 9-504 comment 1. Comment I states that "public sale is recognized, [but] it is hoped that private
sale will be encouraged where, as is frequently the case, private sale through commercial channels
will result in higher realization.., for the benefit of all parties.' Id.
103. U.C.C § 9-504(3) (1978). Section 9-504(3) provides in part that:
[U]nless collateral is perishable or threatens to decline speedily in value or is of a type
customarily sold on a recognized market, reasonable notification of the time and place
of any public sale or reasonable notification of the time after which any private sale or
other intended disposition is to be made shall be sent by the secured party to the
debtor....
Id.
104. Id. 5 9-504 comment 1. See supra note 102 for the relevant text of comment 1.
105. Note, supra note 100, at 474.
106. 423 F. Supp. 468 (D. Del. 1976).
11)7. Rushton v. Shea, 423 F. Supp. 468, 469 (D. Del. 1976). The court in Rushton adopted the
shift approach. Id. at 471.
108. Id. at 469.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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the collateral and, thus, minimize any deficiency for which he will
be liable." "'
Given the purposes for notice described above, the courts were
next required to address the manner in which a secured party must
establish his right to the deficiency. Under the set-off approach, the
debtor was required to come forward with evidence showing that
the lack of notice caused him damage. 112 Courts adopting the shift
approach found this procedure unfair." 3 When a secured creditor
sells collateral without notice, he makes it nearly impossible for the
14
debtor to prove the value of the collateral at the time of the sale.
Once sold, the purchaser may move the collateral far out of the
debtor's reach.1 5 If a debtor cannot prove the value of the
collateral under the set-off approach, he cannot show his loss. The
secured party is in a better position to prove the value of the
collateral at the time of the sale and, therefore, should be required
to do so."16 If the court placed the burden on the debtor, a creditor

who disposes of collateral without notice would gain an advantage
from his own misconduct." 7 The court in Riccardi noted that
placing the burden of proof on the debtor contravened the usual
8
rule that a misbehaving party should bear the burden of proof."1
Because of the inequity of requiring the wronged debtor to come
forward with proof of the loss, courts adopting the shift approach
held that when the secured creditor does not give notice, a
presumption arises that the collateral is worth the amount of the
outstanding indebtedness." 9 A secured party can rebut this
I11. Id. at 469-70. The court in Rushton recognized that the debtor is not the only party that will
be served by requiring notice. Id. Guarantors, accommodation makers, and others in similar
situations have "an equal or greater interest in seeing that the collateral is sold for the best price since
their resources will be called upon to meet the deficiency." Id. at 470.
112. See, e.t., Mercantile Fin. Corp. v. Miller, 292 F. Supp. 797 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (debtor
must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the collateral was worth more than the price
received at the disposition).
113. See, e.g., Norton v. National Bank of Commerce, 240 Ark. 143, 398 S.W.2d 538 (1966)
(requiring debtor to prove the extent of his loss when creditor wrongfully disposes of collateral would
e manifestly unfair); Hall v. Owen County State Bank, 175 Ind. App. 150, 370 N.E.2d 918 (Ct.
App. 1977) (fundamentally unfair to put the burden of showing the value of collateral on debtor
.,hen creditor has sold the collateral without notice).
114. See Norton, 240 Ark. at __, 398 S.W.2d at 542.
115. Id. The court in Norton noted that a chattel such as a car may be 1000 miles away before the
debtor learns of the sale. Id.
116. Hall, 175 Ind. App. at -, 370 N.E.2d at 928.
117. Norton, 240 Ark. at __
, 398 S.W.2d at 542.
118. See Associates Capital Serv. Corp. v. Riccardi, __

R.I.

408 A.2d 930, 933

(1980). In Riccardi the Rhode Island Supreme Court specifically rejected the set-offapproach in favor
of the shift approach because the set-offapproach placed "the burden of proving loss upon the debtor
rather than on the creditor." Id.
119. See, e..,., Weaver v. O'Meara Motor Co., 452 P.2d 87 (Alaska 1969) (when the debtor
shows that the creditor did not comply with the notice provisions of the Code, the burden of proving
that the market value ofthe collateral was received at the sale is upon the secured creditor); Norton v.
National Bank of Commerce, 240 Ark. 143. 398 S.W.2d 538 (1966) (when the creditor wrongfully
disposes of collateral, a presumption arises that the collateral was worth at least the amount of the
debt thereby shifting the burden to the creditor to prove the amount received was reasonable);
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presumption by showing that the collateral sold for its fair market
value at the disposition, despite lack of notice.1 2 0
The shift approach appears to be an equitable mean between
the absolute bar and set-off extremes. By rebutting the arising
presumption, the secured party must show that he did what the
debtor could not do. He must show that he obtained the highest
price possible, through diligent effort, for the collateral.' 2' If the
creditor can show that he obtained the best price at the disposition,
the debtor would not be harmed by the lack of notice. If the secured
party can meet this burden, he has approximated the commercially
reasonable sale and, therefore, is entitled to a deficiency
judgment.

22

Finally, as the Hall court noted, the Code imposes a duty of
good faith on both the debtor and the creditor. 123 The Hall court
stated that it grounded its decision to adopt the shift approach on
the belief that the Code should operate on the premise that most
commercial transactions are carried out in good faith. 1 24 If a party
has not acted in good faith, it is better to adopt a rule that affords
protection to both parties on a case by case basis. 2 5 The shift
approach neither gives the debtor a windfall of an extinguished
deficiency nor the creditor a free hand to dispose of collateral at a
low price and recover the deficiency from the debtor. This
approach provides protection to both parties by requiring an
inquiry into all of the circumstances surrounding a sale.
Coiiiininiiy Mgmt. Ass'n v. Tousley, 32 Colo. App. 33, 505 P.2d 1314 (Ct. App. 1973)
(when the sale is not conducted in compliance with the Code, the secured party has the burden of
proving the market value of the collateral); Hall v. Owen County State Bank, 175 Ind. App. 150,
370 N.E.2d 918 (Ct. App. 1977) (when the secured creditor disposes of collateral without proper
notice, he must prove the reasonable value of the collateral); State Bank of Burleigh County Trust
Co. v. All-American Sub, Inc., 289 N.W.2d 772 (N.D. 1980) (failure to give notice shifts the burden
to the creditor to prove the sale resulted in a fair and reasonable value); Associates Capital Serv.
Corp. v. Riccardi, __
R.I. __
, 408 A.2d 930 (1979) (commercially unreasonable resale of
collateral does not preclude creditor from obtaining a deficiency, but shifts the burden to the creditor
to prove the resale price was reasonable).
120. See, e.g., Weaver v. O'Meara Motor Co., 452 P.2d 87 (Alaska 1969) (creditor met his
burden of proof by showing he received the best available current price; therefore, he was allowed to
recover a deficiency); State Bank of Burleigh County Trust Co. v. All-American Sub, Inc., 289
N.W.2d 772 (N.D. 1980) (creditor received a deficiency by proving that he made a good faith effort
to sell the collateral at the best possible price).
121. See State Bank of Burleigh County Trust Co. v. All-American Sub, Inc., 289 N.W.2d 772
(ND. 1980) (creditor proved that he made a good faith effort to sell the collateral at the best possible
price).
122. Id. The court in All-American Sub determined that the creditor had overcome the
presumption by proving that the fair market value of the collateral did not exceed the amount
received at the sale. Id. at 781. The court, therefore, determined that the creditor was entitled to the
deficiency. Id.
123. Hall, 175 Ind. App. at __,370 N.E.2d at 928.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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THE DEBTOR'S LOST RIGHT OF REDEMPTION

The court in Rushton v. Shea12 6 noted that the notice
requirement gives the debtor an opportunity to exercise his right of
redemption. 2 7 When the creditor sells collateral without notifying
the debtor, this right is lost.

128

This lost right in itself is harm, and

the shift approach fails to compensate the debtor for this lost right.
It appears that the debtor's right of redemption is less deserving of
129
protection than the secured party's right to be made whole.
Perhaps this is so because of the realities of the situation:
redemption really is only a "forlorn hope.' 130 But even when the
right of redemption is lost, the shift approach provides some
protection for the debtor. When the creditor sues the debtor for the
deficiency, the debtor may be able to show that he was willing and
able to redeem and, thus, was harmed by the lack of notice, even if
the collateral brought a fair price. This evidence may be sufficient
to bar recovery of the deficiency or, at least, give rise to damages.
C.

THE COMMERCIALLY UNREASONABLE

SALE PROBLEM

Courts have also utilized the shift approach in cases when the
debtor received notice, but alleged that the disposition was
commercially unreasonable. ' 3' This approach is justifiable since the
issue is the same in both cases: what was the collateral worth at the
time of the disposition? The creditor may dispose of property
improperly, yet still receive a fair price. For example, in Wirth v.
126. 423 F. Supp. 468 (D. Del. 1976).
127. Rushton v. Shea, 423 F. Supp. 468, 469 (D. Del. 1976). The court in Rushton stated thsat
notice allows the debtor an opportunity to redeem, to challenge the disposition before it is made, or
to locate other potential purchasers. See id.The court did note, however, that the chance to challenge
the disposition and the opportunity to locate other purchasers, rather than the right to redeem,.
particularly served the ultimate goal of maximizing the sale price and minimizing the deficiencv. Id.
at 469-70.
128. See Braswell v. American Nat'l Bank, 117 Ga. App. 699, 161 S.E. 2d 420 (CI. App. 1968)
(selling collateral without notice precludes the debtor from exercising his right of'redemption).
129. But see id. The court in Braswell held that because the secured creditor did not comply with
the notice provisions he deprived the debtor of his right of redemption; for that reason the court
denied any deficiency. Id. at
-, 161 S.E.2d at 422.
130. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL COD)E
26-9 at 1109 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as WHITE & SUMMERS]. The authors contend that the
debtor's chances of acquiring enough money to redeem the collateral after default are minimal. Id.
131. See, e.g., Kobuk Eng'g & Contracting Serv., Inc. v. Superior Tank & Conslr. Co-Alaska.
Inc., 568 P.2d 1007 (Alaska 1977) (burden of proving commercial reasonableness of sale after default
is on the creditor); Wirth v. Heavey, 508 S.W.2d 263 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974) (improper resale of
collateral does not bar a deficiency when the creditor can show the price received was reasonable);
Cornett v. White Motor Corp., 190 Neb. 496, 209 N.W.2d 341 (1973) (the effect ofa conmercially
unreasonable sale is to alter the amount of the deficiency, not extinguish the deficiency); Associates
Capital Serv. Corp. v. Riccardi, __
R.I. __
, 408 A.2d 930 (1979) (consequence of a
commercially unreasonable sale of collateral is the creation of a presumption that the lair market
value of the collateral equals the debt).
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Heavey 132 the Missouri Court of Appeals held that the creditor
should have sold the collateral at a public rather than private sale
133
and, therefore, the disposition was commercially unreasonable.
Despite this noncompliance, the court held that the collateral
and the secured
brought its fair market value at the disposition
134
party was entitled to a deficiency judgment.
IV. REBUTTING THE PRESUMPTION
The first problem a party must overcome in obtaining a
deficiency judgment in a shift approach jurisdiction is determining
how noncompliance becomes an issue at trial. In United States v.
Whitehouse Plastics135 the court stated that the debtor must allege
and prove a violation and come forward with evidence
demonstrating the loss sustained by that violation. 136 At this point,
the presumption arises obligating the secured party to prove that
the fair market value of the collateral was received at the
disposition. 137 This leaves a substantial burden on the debtor since
he must prove that he suffered harm from the alleged misbehavior
of the secured party. 138 In Clark Leasing Corp. v. White Sands Forest
Products, Inc., 1 39 however, the New Mexico Supreme Court held
that a secured party, when suing for a deficiency, should allege and
prove that the disposition was conducted in compliance with the
Code. 140 If the secured party could not prove that the disposition
132. 508 S.W.2d 263 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
133. Wirth v. Heavey, 508 S.W.2d 263, 268 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974). The court in Wirth noted
that the private sale of the collateral was improper and the debtor, therefore, was entitled to a
remedy. Id.
134. Id. The court in Wirth determined that the proper remedy was not a denial of the
deficiency, but damages for the loss caused by a creditor's failure to comply with the resale
provisions. Id. The court concluded that the price obtained from the sale of the collateral in Wirth was
reasonable and, therefore, the debtor suffered no compensable damage. Id.
135. 501 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1974).
136. See United States v. Whitehouse Plastics, 501 F.2d 692, 695 (5th Cir. 1974). The court in
Whitehouse stated that the debtor is free to submit any evidence that he was prejudiced by the lack of
notice. Id. at 696.
137. Id. at 695.
138. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 130, at 1131-32. Professors White and Summers define
the procedure as follows:
The rules of the game ... seem fairly clear. First, the secured party brings suit for
a deficiency. The debtor responds by claiming that his opponent violated the
provisions of Part Five of Article Nine in some way. If the court finds that the secured
party committed a foul it penalizes him by indulging in the presumption that the value
of the collateral is equal to the outstanding debt. However, the secured party can still
recover a deficiency if he can convince the court that the reasonable value of the
collateral was less than the outstanding debt.
Id.
139.87 N.M. 451, 535 P.2d 1077 (1975).
-, 535 P.2d
140. Clark Leasing Corp. v. White Sands Forest Prods., Inc., 87 N.M. 451,
1077, 1080 (1975). The court in Clark Leasing stated that "[i]t is scarcely a revelation to say that a
plaintilf normally has the burden of proving his case." Id.
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was conducted in compliance with the Code, he would have to
rebut the presumption to obtain a deficiency. 14 1 If the secured party
can establish a prima facie case indicating compliance, the debtor
would be required to elicit evidence to the contrary. 14 2 When the
secured party establishes a prima facie case indicating compliance
and the debtor elicits evidence to the contrary, the matter becomes
an issue for the trier of fact. 143 Under the White Sands approach, the
debtor need only show noncompliance, not loss caused by the
noncompliance. However the court phrases the issue, the secured
party must still produce evidence of the value of the collateral once
the presumption has arisen.

A.

ESTABLISHING VALUE

1. Price Obtainedat the Disposition
When the disposition is conducted in accordance with the
requirements of the Code, the amount received or bid at the sale is
evidence of the collateral's true value in an action to recover a
deficiency. 144 If the price obtained at the disposition is grossly
disproportionate to the outstanding debt, however, courts will
closely scrutinize the steps that the secured party took to obtain the
4
best possible price. 1

5

Comparing the price obtained at the disposition with the
original contract price may not always be a reliable indicator of
141. Id.at - ,535 P.2dat 1080.
142. Id. The curt noted that if the cebtor does not show evidence of' commercial
tuireasonatilhniss in the sail, he secured party will obtain a directed verlict on this issue. Id.
143. Id.at __, 535 P.2d at 1081. The court in Clark Leasing reasoned that parties may difler
ri'garding what fators art rchlvant in determining commercial reasonableness; therefore, each case
must turn on its particulr fatts. Id.
144. Se' (CoouUnity Mgit. Ass'n v. 'lousley, :2 Colo. App. 33, 505 P.2d 1314 (Ct.
App. 1973). See alo In reZsa Zsa ltd., 352 F. Supp. 665 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (that the price received at a
lawlul disposititt is low will not bc dispositive on the issue of (oiniercial reasonableness); U.C.C.
.95
907 (2) (1978) (fact that a difitriou price could have been o btained from a different method ofsale
or it a difiercit tim' is not of itsIlf sufficient to establish that the sale was commercially
till reasoinable).

145. See Livers v. Rio King land & Inv. Co., 93 Nev. 95, 560 P.2d 917 (1977). In Levers the
irditr pccrfuwd a siturity interest in the dltor's

supplies toisecure a $35,000 promissory note. Id.

hi (lelbior lefhulted, the credittr repossessed the collateral and
at
-, 561 P.2d at 918. A'r
lislposvd of' it at a nionjdicial salt. Id.At the salethe creditor purchased the collateral for $100 and
, 56(0 P.2d at 918-19. Afier reviewing the nature ofthe
sulbsquently resold it Ior $10,000. Id.at sale,ti( Ne",iada Snpretnit Ciiurt held that the salt was commercially unreasonable and limited the
, 560 P.2d at 920. But seeIn re Zsa Zsa Ltd.,
(rtor's fiinmy tufgmint i$l $25,000. Id. at the debtor's inventory at auction lbr
352 F. SUpli. 665 (S. I). N.Y. 1972). In ZIsa Zsa the creditor siuld
$30,0001. Id.at 668. '[hi' inveniory hail an estimated retail value of $3.5 million, a wholesale value
of $1.5 million, and a cost of, $500,000. Id. Thc court determined that even though the amount
rcccivcd was onlv 10 cetils on ii' dollar, the price was nt unreasonable. Id. at 671. The court based
liw auctioieer's testimony that this was a fIir return and a price other purported
this iciisi oitl
Ibiddlcrs
wcrv willing (1 Pay. Idl.
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value. For example, the collateral may have depreciated
substantially in value through market conditions or misuse by the
debtor. In this situation, the resale price obtained for the collateral
will be much lower than the original contract price.
2. Stipulation
One of the simplest ways to establish value is by stipulation. 146
If the secured party obtains the stipulated value at the resale, the
sale was commercially
debtor cannot claim that the
unreasonable. 147
3. Appraisals
An appraisal of the collateral at the time of repossession is an
excellent method of establishing the value of the collateral. In
particular, if the collateral is poorer than average, an appraisal can
establish the collateral's diminished value.1 4 8 A resale price that
approximates the appraisal price will substantially bolster a secured
party's argument that she received the best possible price for the
collateral at the disposition.
A person familiar with the collateral should make the
appraisal. 149 The appraiser should examine the collateral himself,
but this is not always necessary if the creditor can provide the
15 0
appraiser with a sufficiently accurate description of the collateral.
Employees of the secured party may make the appraisals, but these
appraisals are subject to attack because the appraiser is not a
disinterested party.1 5' The creditor may also use a reference book
used in a particular trade to estimate the value of the collateral. 152
146. See Conti Causeway Ford v. Jarossy, 114 N.J. Super. 382, 276 A.2d 402 (Ocean County
Ct. 1971). The parties in Conti stipulated that the resale price was fair and reasonable. Id. at 405. The
court, therefore, determined that the secured party had met his burden of proving commercial
reasonableness. Id.

147. Seeid.
148. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 130, at 1119. Professors White and Summers suggest
that, when the resale amount is less than the apparent value, a "creditor should arm himself with
memoranda and photographs to substantiate the 'poorer than average' nature of the collateral." Id.
149. See Mayhew v. Loveless, 613 S.W.2d 118 (Ark. Ct. App. 1981). In Mayhew the debtor
introduced evidence from an expert witness that the debtor's tractor-trailer was worth between
$26,000 - $29,000, rather than the $10,500 the creditor obtained from the resale. Id. at 121. The
expert witness had never driven the tractor and admitted he had " 'just kind of given it a sidewalk
appraisal.' " Id. The court found that the evidence did not support the debtor's contention that the
collateral was worth $26,000 and held that the 510,500 obtained from the resale was reasonable. Id.
150. See Weaver v. O'Meara Motor Co., 452 P.2d 87 (Alaska 1969). In Weaver the creditor
obtained appraisals from numerous sources based upon the written description of the collateral. Id.
at 92 n. 17. The creditor sold the collateral to the party that had given him the highest appraisal. Id.
The court held that the creditor's actions were commercially reasonable. Id. at 92.
151. See, e.g., United States v. Whitehouse Plastics, 501 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1974) (although
employee's appraisal is subject to attack, the jury is entitled to consider it); State Bank of Burleigh
County Trust Co. v. All-American Sub, Inc., 289 N.W.2d 772 (N.D. 1980) (employee's appraisals
are subject to attack, but this alone does not invalidate the appraisals).
152. See, e.g., Credit Bureau Metro, Inc. v. Mims, 45 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 12, 119 Cal. Rptr.
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4. Market Conditions
The saleability of collateral is generally a factor in determining
In Wirth v. Heavey154 the collateral consisted of
restaurant equipment specifically designed for a particular
franchise.1 55 The court noted that the equipment had a very limited
157
use, which in part justified the low resale price. 156 In Hoch v. Ellis
the court stated that the local economic market at the time of the
disposition is a recognized factor in determining the value of the
collateral. 158
its value. 1 5 3

5. Subsequent Sales
When the purchaser resells the collateral soon after
disposition, the price obtained at the subsequent sale may be
evidence of the value of the property. 159 Evidence that the
purchaser sold the collateral for nearly the same price at a second
sale indicates that the creditor sold the property at its fair value. 160
Conversely, if the purchaser sold the collateral for a much higher
price at the second sale, a court may find that the price obtained at
161
the first sale was not equal to the collateral's fair value.
622 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1975) (automobile sold at private sale for less than 50% of Blue Book
value was unreasonable as a matter of law); State Bank of Burleigh County Trust Co. v. AllAmerican Sub, Inc., 289 N.W.2d 772 (N.D. 1980) (value of collateral was based on prices in
reference books used in the restaurant equipment trade); Ekman v. Mountain Motors, Inc., 364
P.2d 998 (Wyo. 1961) (when damage or other factors exist that may influence the collateral's value,
reference book is merely a guide). See also WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 130, at 1117 ("Even when
such handbooks are only considered a guide to valuation, they will provide the attorney with a rough
standard by which to measure the sufficiency of the price received.").
153. See Hall v. Owen County State Bank, 175 Ind. App. 150, 370 N.E.2d 918 (Ct. App. 1977).
The court in Hall stated that:
[E]ven though a low sale price itself is insufficient to overturn a sale, closer scrutiny
will generally be given sales in which there is a substantialdifference between the sale
price and the fair value to determine whether there were legitimate causes for the low
price such as a depressed or non-existent market....
Id. at

__, 370 N.E.2d at 929 (emphasis in original).
154. 508 S.W.2d 263 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974).
155. Wirth v. Heavey, 508 S.W.2d 263 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974). The restaurant franchise in Wirth
was Mugs-Up. Id. at 264.
156. Id. at 268. Both parties in Wirth testified that the market for used restaurant equipment was
not widespread - particularly not for the kind specially designed for use in a particular franchise. Id.
157. 627 P.2d 1060 (Alaska 1981).
158. Hoch v. Ellis, 627 P.2d 1060 (Alaska 1981). The court in Hoch noted that at the time of the
disposition, Fairbanks, Alaska was in a "severe economic slump." Id. at 1064.
159. Compare Levers v. Rio King Land & Inv. Co., 93 Nev. 95, 560 P.2d 917 (1977) (evidence
that purchaser at the disposition resold the collateral at 100 times the purchase price indicated
disposition sale was not commercially reasonable) with O'Neil v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 533 S.W.2d
832 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (evidence that purchaser at the disposition resold the collateral for an
amount slightly in excess of the purchase price indicated the disposition sale was commercially
reasonable).
160. O'Neil, 533 S.W.2d at 837.
161. Levers, 93 Nev. at __, 560 P.2d at 920.
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Moreover, a great disparity between these prices may indicate that
the secured party did not proceed in good faith or in a commercially
reasonable manner.

162

6. Testimony of the Purchaser
Testimony by the purchaser of the collateral may also be
helpful in determining the collateral's value. In Hoch v. Ellis1 63 the
Alaska Supreme Court noted that the superior court "placed
considerable weight on the testimony of [the purchaser of the
equipment]. ' 164 The purchaser in Hoch testified that he thought
165
his purchase was a gamble and that he paid a reasonable price.
The purchaser also gave a detailed description of the cost and effort
necessary to make the collateral operable. 166 The Alaska Supreme
Court agreed with the superior court's determination that the
purchaser's estimate of value before his purchase, the cost of repair,
167
and the use of the collateral was evidence of the collateral's value.
B.

ESTABLISHING COMMERCIAL REASONABLENESS

Although courts place much emphasis upon the price the
creditor received at the disposition, the price is not the only factor
courts must consider in determining the availability of a
deficiency. 168 Section 9-507(2) of the Code states that "[t]he fact
that a better price could have been obtained by a sale at a different
time or in a different method from that selected by the secured
party is not of itself sufficient to establish that the sale was not made
in a commercially reasonable manner." 169 The Hall court noted
that section 9-507 reflects that repossession sales seldom bring the
highest value for the collateral. 170 If the courts required
the creditor to obtain the highest possible price for the collateral, all
162. But seeHall v. Owen County State Bank, 175 Ind. App. 150, 370 N.E.2d 918 (Ct. App.
1977). The court in Hall noted that factors other than a secured party's failure to proceed in a
commercially reasonable manner may create a substantial difference between the sale price and the
fair value of the collateral. Id. at __, 370 N.E.2d at 929. These factors may include a depressed or
nonexistent market. Id.
163. 627 P.2d 1060 (Alaska 1981).
164. Hoch v. Ellis, 627 P.2d 1060, 1064 (Alaska 1981).
165. Id. The purchaser testified that he paid $10,000, but that he did not think he would have
paid more for the collateral. Id. n. 11.
166. Id. at 1064.
167. Id. The court in Hoch noted that the purchaser's testimony substantiated other evidence,
which indicated the collateral was severely dilapidated. Id.
168. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 130, at 1119. Professors White and Summers state that
"[p]rice is important, but resales may fail the test of 'commercial reasonableness' in other ways
also." Id.
169. U.C.C. S 9-507(2) (1978).
170. Hall, 175 Ind. App. at__,
370 N.E.2d at 929.
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dispositions would be vulnerable to attack by showing that a higher
171
price might have been received under different circumstances.
The court should consider the sale in its entirety in determining
whether the sale was commercially reasonable, and thus, whether
the secured party should be denied his deficiency in whole or in
part. 172 When the secured party has proceeded in good faith and
made certain that the "conditions of the sale, in terms of the
aggregate effect of manner, method, time, place and terms
employed conform to commercially accepted standards, he should
be shielded from the sanctions contained in Article 9."173
One of the factors that courts will examine to determine
whether the secured party proceeded in good faith is the solicitation
of bidders. 174 If the creditor has actively solicited bidders, this
indicates that he has done his best to get a good price for the
collateral. In Weaver v. O'Meara Motor Car Co. 175 the vice president
of O'Meara Motor testified that he received written appraisals
from persons doing business within the state and from persons
doing business in three other states. 176 An accountant acting on
behalf of O'Meara Motor testified that she solicited bids within the
State of Alaska without success. 1 77 The court found that these
solicitations were factors indicating that O'Meara had made a good
faith effort to get the best possible price. 178 In State Bank of Burleigh
County Trust Co. v. All-American Sub, Inc. 179 the bank hired an outside
sales company to solicit buyers.18 0 The North Dakota Supreme
171. Id.
172. Id. at __ , 370 P.2d at 928-29. The Code does not specifically define a commercially
reasonable sale. The Code does, however, state that the total transaction must be considered in
determining commercial reasonableness. See U.C.C. 5 9-504(3) (1978). Section 9-504(3) provides
that "every aspect of the disposition including the method, manner, time, place and terms must be
commercially reasonable." Id.
173. Hall, 175 Ind. App. at __,
370 N.E.2d at 929 (citing In re Zsa Zsa Ltd., 352 F. Supp.
665, 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)).
174. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 130, at 1121. Professors White and Summers note,
"Although Article 9 does not require a specific number of bidders, every single-bid sale invites
scrutiny. It may well be that multiple invitations to bid are a prerequisite of a commercially
reasonable sale." Id. See also Atlas Constr. Co. v. Dravo-Doyle Co., 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 124 (Pa. C.P. Allegheny County 1965). In Atlas the creditor's selling territory covered
parts of Ohio, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and West Virginia. Id. at 131. The creditor, however, made
no effort to contact a purchaser for the collateral other than Campbell, who bought the collateral. Id.
The court determined that the substantially low price, together with the evidence that the creditor
contacted only one purchaser, warranted the jury's conclusion that the sale was not commercially
reasonable. Id.
175. 452 P.2d 87 (Alaska 1969).
176. Weaver v. O'Meara Motor Car Co., 452 P.2d 87, 92 n.17 (Alaska 1969). In Weaver the
creditor obtained written appraisals from Alaska as well as California, Oregon, and Washington. Id.
The collateral was eventually sold to a Washington firm that submitted the highest appraisal. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 92. The Weaver court held that the creditor had met his burden by establishing that he
received the best available current price for the collateral; therefore the sale was commercially
reasonable. Id.
179. 289 N.W.2d 772 (N.D. 1980).
180. State Bank ofBurleigh County Trust Co. v. All-American Sub, Inc., 289 N.W.2d 772, 780
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Court held that this was a good faith effort to receive the best
possible price. 181

While it is desirable to have a large number of bidders at a
disposition, it is not mandatory.1 8 2 The Hall court indicated that a
sale would not be commercially unreasonable as a matter of law
when the creditor received only one or two bids, but "such sales
must receive-the closest scrutiny and should be declared invalid
where there is evidence of collusion, self-dealing, or bad faith.' '183
When the creditor disposes of the collateral at a public sale, the
courts may look to the sufficiency of the advertisement of the
sale. 184 In United States v. Whitehouse Plastics1 85 the court noted that
the auction company that the secured party employed publicized
the sale and kept records of the advertisements placed by the
auction company concerning the sale. 186 In a footnote, however,
the court stated that a secured party could not "bootstrap its way to
a verdict based on the price received at the foreclosure sale where
that is the only evidence of the value of the goods or where the sale
is less well publicized or conducted than this one.' '187
V. CONCLUSION
The Uniform Commercial Code does not authorize summary
denial of a deficiency judgment. Such a denial, because it
precludes a decision on the merits of each case, is a harsh, punitive,
and unwarranted measure. The Code prohibits the award of
punitive damages. For this reason the absolute, bar approach to
noncompliance problems is improper.
The set-off approach is also an inequitable solution because it
requires the debtor to submit evidence proving a loss. The
noncomplying secured party is in a better position to prove the
value of the collateral at the time of the sale. By requiring 'the
debtor to prove the loss, courts are in effect allowing secured parties
to profit from their own wrong-doing.
(N.D. 1980). The bank in All-American Sub was unable to obtain bids tr the sale of the collateral and,
therelire, hired.Jet Sales to solicit buyers. Id.
181. Id. at 781. The court affirmed the district court's finding that the sale of the collateral was
commercially reasonable. Id.
182. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 130, at 1121. (Article 9 does not require a specific
numnler of bidders).
183. Hall, 175 Ind. App. at
, 370 N.E.2d at 930.
184. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 130, at 1121. Professors White and Summers state that
"jonc lactor of'great importance is the manner in which the sale is publicized ....
Id.
185. 501 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1974).
186. United States v. Whitehouse Plastics, 501 F.2d 692, 697 (5th Cir. 1974). The court
deterinied that because of the advertisements and evidence that 140 to 145 registered bidders were
present, the "*jury could find, as it did, that the sale was 'commercially reasonable.' ' Id.
187. Id. n. 9.
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The shift approach is more equitable than the extremes of the
absolute bar approach and set-off approach. It neither provides a
technical defense to debtors nor burdens them with proving harm.
Protecting the debtor from loss by secured party noncompliance is
one of the goals of the resale provisions of section 9-504 of the
Code. When a secured party can rebut the presumption that the
collateral was worth at least the amount of the outstanding debt, he
shows that the debtor has not suffered a loss. Providing flexibility in
dispositions is another goal: the Code only requires that notice and
resale be commercially reasonable. Because the shift approach
allows for inquiry into the reasonableness of notice and disposition,
it protects the interests of both debtors and creditors. This being the
goal of section 9-504 of the Code, the shift approach is the best
solution to noncompliance problems.

